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Abstract 
This paper introduces the notion of 
objection-based causal networks. which 
resemble probabilistic causal networks ex­
cept that tht:>y are quant.ified using ob­
jections. An objection is a logical sen­
tence and denotes a condition under 
which a causal dependency does not exist. 
Objection-based causal net.works enjoy al­
most all the properties that make proba­
bilistic causal networks popular, with the 
added advantage that objections are, ar­
guably. more int.uitive than probabilities. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic causal networks (PCNs) [1. 11] have re­
rently become very popular in many practical do­
mains. such as medical diagnosis [8]. vision [10). lan­
guage understanding [7]. and map learning [5). A 
major difficulty in constructing these networks is pro­
viding prior and conditional probabilities that quan­
tify root nodes and causal dependencies. Most people 
find these probabilities overly detailed and counterin­
tuitive [6). The work described in this paper attempts 
to overcome this difficulty by introducing the notion 
of objection-based causal networks (OCNs). Root 
nodes and causal dependencies in OCNs are quanti­
fied by providing objections rather than probabilities. 
In PCNs. a causal dependency between nodes is 
quantified by providing a number in the interval [0.1]. 
For example. the depeudency from .4 = "Tlw grass is 
wet'' to B = "My shoes are wet" may be quantified by 
p = .�5. The number pis int.erpret.ed as a conditional 
probability of the effect B given the cause A. Condi­
tional probabilities are usually assessed by a domain 
expert or obtained from statistical data. However. 
most domain experts have difficulty assessing these 
probabilities and stat-istical data may not always be 
available [6. 1). 
In OCNs, a causal dependency between nodes is 
quantified hy providing a logical sentence under 
which tlw dependency does not exist. For example, 
the dependency from "The grass is wet" t.o "My shoes 
are wet" may be quantified by C = "I did not step 
on the grass." The sentence C is called an objec­
tion and plays the same role played by the number 
p given above. The semantics of objections is based 
on the notions of objection-based states of belief and 
objection-based conditionalization [4), which are the 
counterpart.s of probabilistic states of belief and prob­
abilistic conditionalization, respectively. 
One could state at least three factors that make PCNs 
so popular. First, PCNs allow the representation of 
non-binary beliefs, which is not. allowed by classical 
logic representations. Next, constructing a consistent 
PCN is much easier and more systematic than con­
structing a consistent classical logic theory. Finally, 
PCNs an• based on probability theory. which sup­
ports many patterns of plausible reasoning [11. 12) 
that. are not supported by classical logic. 
OCNs enjoy all the above properties. Section 2 shows 
that an OCN can be interpreted as a state of belief 
that allows non-binary beliefs. Section 3 shows that 
constructing a consistent OCN is very similar to con­
structing a PCN. Finally. Section 4 shows how to 
compute a state of belief represented by an OCN, 
and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
2 OBJECTION-BASES STATES OF 
BELIEF 
In probability calculus. we assess our ronfidence in a 
sentence by providing a number in the interval [U. 1). 
If we have complete confidence in a sentence. we give 
it a probability of l; otherwise, we give it a probabil­
ity of less than one. Another way to assess our con­
fidence in a. sentence is by providing an objectiOn to 
that sentence. For example. an objection to ''Twf:'ety 
is a bird implies Tweety flies" is "Tweety is wing­
less." This choice of assessing one's confidence leads 
to objection calculus. which underlies objection-bas�>d 
states of belief and causal net.works. 
Se<'lion 2.1 shows that an objection-based causal net-
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work can he interpreted as an ohjectiou-hased state 
of belief . Sectiows 2.2. 2.3. and 2.4 discuss objection­
based states of belief in more details . 
2.1 TWO CLASSES OF CAUSAL 
NETWORKS 
A quantified causal network is interpreted as a state 
of belief which maps a propositional language C into 
degrees of support. 1 The language C. is formed from 
primitive proposit-ions corresponding to nodes in the 
causal network and from logical connectives. For 
example. the net.work of Figure I has five nodes, 
P1 . ... . Ps. and the st. ate of belief represented by that 
network has the sentence P1 V P2 = .. It rained or the 
sprinkler was on"' in its domain. 
Figure I: A causal network with five primitive 
propositions. Depending on how the network is 
quantified. it may become a probabilistic causal 
network or an objection-based causal network . 
The network is int-erpreted as a mapping from a 
language C into degrees of support (probabilities or 
objections). The language Cis formed from primi­
tive propositions P1, . . . , P5 and logical connectives 
1\, .....  V and :). 
If degrees of support are probabilities . then a state 
of belief and the causal network representing it are 
called probabilistic. Figure I and Table 2 constitute 
a PCN. On the other hand, if degrees of support are 
objections. then a state of belief and the causal net­
work repre"enting it. are called objection-ba'>ed. Fig­
ure 1 and Table 3 const.itute an OCN. 
From here on. I assume that objections are sentences 
in a propositional language 0. I also assume that 
primitive propositions of the languages C and ('J are 
disjoint. 
1 I assume that the support for a sent.ence does not 
determine that for its negat.ion. l1 i!< common. though. 
to assume that the belief in a sentence determine!' that 
of its negation. I use the term �support� as opposed to 
�helief� to emphasize this difference. 
2.2 OBJECTIONS 
Thf> notion of objl'r l ion is cf'nt.ral iu objPction-based 
states of belief . In this SIO'ction. I discuss this notion 
and some related ones in more details. 
If ell : C - 0 is an objection-based state of belief. 
then ell(A) is the objf'ction of ell to A. Here, ell(A) is 
the reason why ell has less than complete confi denrfO' 
in .4.. If ell(A) is a tautology. we say that ell njtcl8 
.4. and accepts -..4. And if ell( .4.) is a contradict-ory 
sentence . we say that ell has no objertwn to .4 .. 
If o is fhf objection of ell to A. then any sent.ence 
entailing a is also an obj ection of ell to A. 
Definition 1 We say that a state of belief ell 
objects to A undt'r a if and only if a f= ell( A). 
If the information available to a state ell contradicts 
its objection to A, then under no further information 
will ell object to A. 
Definition 2 We say that a state of belief ell admits 
A under o if and only if o f= -.ell( A). 
Let us consider an example. Suppose that the lan� 
guage C is defined over primitive propositions corre­
sponding to the nodes of Figure 1. and suppose that. 
the language 0 is defined over the following primitive 
propositions: 
01 = "The grass is covered," 
02 = "The sprinkler is faulty," 
03 = ''It is dark,'' 
04 = "I did not step on the grass," 
Or; = ''Something is abnormal." 
If cl>( P3 :::J Ps) = 04• then the objection of ell to "The 
grass is wet implies my shoes are wet" is ''I did not 
st.ep on the grass." Moreover, ell objects to "The gras� 
is wet implies my shoes are wet" under ··I did not ste-p 
on the grass," and admits it under "I stepped on tht> 
grass."' 
2.3 CONSISTENCY 
Probability theory imposes three consistency condi­
tions on probabilistic states of belief. First. the prob­
ability of a tautology must be one. Second. the prob­
ability of a disjunction of logically disjoint sent.enres 
must be the sum of the probabilities of each of the dis­
juncts. Finally. equivalent sentences must have equal 
probabilit-ies. An objection-ba<oed state of belief ell 
has three corresponding conditions: 
1. 4>(true) :: false:2 A tautology has a. contradic­
tory objection. 
2 I use true as a constant �tanding for an�· ta.ut.olo­
gous sentence and false as a constant standiug for any 
contradictory sentence. 
2. �(A VB)=: �(A) 1\ <I>( B): <l> objects to .-1. VB 
precisely when it. objerts t.o A and to B. 
3. �(A) =: �(B) if .4 =: B: Equivalent sentences 
have equivalent. objections. 
2.4 OBJECTIONABILITY. BELIEF. AND 
IGNORANCE 
I will conclude this sec t ion by discussing three i mpor­
tant concepts: object.ionahility, belief. and ignorance . 
These concepts enrich the language used to describe 
stat.es of belief. 
In probability calculus we t.alk about. a sentence being 
no more probable than another sentence. In objec­
tion calc ulus we talk about a sentence being no more 
objectionable than another. 
Definition 3 
Wt say that A z.� no mon ohj�:rtwn.ablt than B m 
statt <I> 2/ a1id only zf: 
�(.4) I= �(B). 
In probability calculus we say that a sentence is no 
more believed than another if and only if it is no more 
probable. In objection calculus. however . the relation 
between belief and objectionability is more involved. 
Definition 4 H'e .say that .4 zs no more belie11ed than 
B i11 .state of heltef� if and only If (a) B 1s no moT'e 
obJeCtionable than A w <I> and (h) -..4 is no more 
ohjectionablt than -,B in <I>. 
The two conditions in Definition 4 ma.y seem redun­
dant. but this is not true. Table 1 provides a coun­
terexample. 
.c (I .c (I 
bird 11 fly -.nonaal bird false 
bird 11 -.fly noi'Jial -.bird false 
-.bird 11 fly true fly -.noi'Jial 
-.bird 1\ -,fly false -.fly false 
Table l: An objection-based state of belief. Here, 
-.bird is no more objectionable than -,:fly, be­
cause the objection to -.bird entails the objection 
to -.:fly (false F false). Note, however. that. :fly 
is more objectionable than bird, because the ob­
jection to bird strictly entails the objection to fly 
(false F -,normal). 
In objection calculus, we- can define the- ignorancf" of 
a st.ate- of belief ahout a f-'ent.ence as follows. 
Definition 5 Let � : C - 0 be an objtetzon-based 
stat( of belief and let A be a sentence in C. The 
rgnomnce of� about A 1s defined as follows: 
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Intuitivf'ly. T(A.. <I>) is the weakest sentence- in 0 un­
der which <J>. admits both A and -..-L 
At one extreme. T(A. <J>.) is a t.autology. This means 
that <) admits both A and -..4 under any sentence in 
0, and we say that� is maJ·imaily iguomnt about A. 
Note that maximal ignorance happens only when <l> 
has no objection to either A or -.A: <J>.( A) =: �( -,.{) =: 
false. 
At. the other extreme. 1( .4, <I») is a contradiction .  
This means that under no consistent sentence in L'J 
will � admit A and -.A. We say that � is mlrmna/ly 
ignorant about A. in this case. Note that minimal 
ignorance happens only when �(A) =: ..... �( -,.4). 
Definition 6 We say that a state of belief� is 110 
more 1gnorant about A. than about B if and only if: 
T(A.. �)I= T(B. <1»). 
That is, whenever <I» admits A and -.A. it also admits 
B and -.B. 
3 COMPONENTS OF A CAUSAL 
NETWORK 
A quantified causal network has three components. 
One component is a directed graph such as the one 
depict-ed in Figure 1. which is referred to a<J an un­
quantified causal network. The topology of this graph 
contains information that partially defines a state of 
belief. and is the subject of Section 3.3. Another com­
ponent of a causal network consists of prior degrees 
of support . These are either probabilities or objec­
tions attributed to root nodes of the network and are 
the subject of Section 3.1. The last component. of a 
causal network consists of conditional degrees of sup­
port. These are either probabilities or objections that 
quantify causal dependencies in the network and are 
the subject of Section 3.2. The three components of 
a causal network fully define a state of belief. 
3.1 PRlOR SUPPORTS 
The first component of a causal network requires two 
degrees of support for each root node P;. One of 
these degrees represents the support for Pi and the 
other represents the support. for -,P;. For example, 
the ne-twork of Figure 1 requires four prior dPgr�>es 
of support , which are attributed to each of P1 = ·'It 
rained." ....,pl = "It. did not. rain," P� = "The sprinkler 
wa"> on,·· and -,p2 = ''The sprinkler was off." 
In PCNs . prior supports are probabilities and must 
satisfy the following consistency condition: P(P;) + 
P( -.Pi) = 1. Tables 2 depicts prior probabilities for 
the network of Figure 1. 
In OCNs, prior supports are objections and must 
satisfy the following consist.ency condition: �( P,) A 
�(-.Pi) =:false. This condition ensures that P; and 
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P(PJ) 
P(-.PJ) 
P(f'z) 
P(-.Pz) 
A 
P(P,_I A) 
P(-.PJ j.A) 
Table 2: A 
network lil 
A p, -,p, 
.5 P(P4IAJ .75 l) 
.5 P(-.P,j A) .25 1 
.5 P(f'�_l A) .9 .5 
.. 5 P(-.P� I .4.) .I .5 
pl II P2 P1 11-P2 -P1 II P? ...,pl 1\ ...,p1 
.Y5 .9 .8 0 
. 0.5 .1 .1 1 
probabilistic quantification of the causal 
Figure 1. The above prohabilit.it:>s and 
Figure 1 constitute a probabilist.i<- causal network . 
-.P; are not objected to simultaneously. Tables 3 de­
picts prior objections for the network of Figure 1. 
3.2 CONDITIONAL SUPPORTS 
From hert:> on. I refer t.o a set. of propositions hy the ir 
indices. For example, propositions P1 • . . .  , Pk are re­
ferred to by 1, . . . . k. I also define a conjunction over 
a set. of propositions I to be a sentence in £. denoted 
by [1], which has the form: 
[I] = (\ [-.]P;, 
iE! 
where [-.] means that the negation sign may or may 
not appear .4 For example, there are four conjunc­
tions over propositions 1.2: P11\P2. -.?11\?2, P11\-.P2 
and --.?1 1\ -,p2· 
The second component of a causal network requires 
2"+1 degrees of support for each node P; with n par­
ents. Half of these degrees are supports for P; and the 
other half belongs to -.P;. Each of these supports is 
conditioned on a conjunction over the parents of P;. 
In PCNs. conditional degrees of support are condi­
tional probabilities and must. satisfy the following 
consistency condition: P(P;IA) + P(-.P;IA) = 1. Ta­
ble 2 depicts conditional probabilities for the network 
of Figure 1. For example, the conditional probability 
of Ps = "My shoes are wet" given P3 = "The grass 
is wef' is .9 . 
In OCNs, conditional degrees of support are condi­
tional objections and must satisfy the following con­
sistency wndition: �A ( P;) 1\41.4 ( -.P;) =false. Here. 
41 A ( P;) and 41.4 ( -.P;) are the condit.ional objections 
toP; and-.?,-. respectively. given .4. Table 3 depicts 
conditional objections for the network of Figure 1.  
For example . a conditional ob jection to P5 = "'My 
shoes are wet'' given P3 = "The grass is wet" is 04 
= "I did not step on the grass." 
We know the meaning of conditional probabilities . 
hut what is the meaning of conditional objections? 
4 If [I] appears more than once in the same equation, 
then it refers to the same conjunction. 
3.2.1 Objection-based couditionalization 
A prohabilist.ic state of belief P is changed using 
Bayes condit.ioualization. which st.ates that the prob­
ability of B after observing A is P(B 1\ .i.)/P(A).5 
Our goal in this section is to present. a condit ional­
ization rule for objection-based state of belief that 
is analogous to Bayes conditionalization. therefore. 
giving mf'aning to conditional objections. 
Let 41 A be thl" state of belief resulting from observ­
ing A in the statt> 41. The least we should expect 
about t.he conditionalized state 41 A is that it accepts 
A. Note. however, that there are manv states of be­
lief satisfying this property, and some �f these states 
do not match our intuitions about. belief change. We 
therefore need to impose more constraints on a condi­
t.ionalized state of belief so that undesirable changes 
iu belief are excluded . 
I will now state a convention and an intuition about. 
objection-based belief change. I will then present a 
conditionalization rule that is implied by the star.ed 
convention and intuition. First is the convention: 
An accepted sentence remains accepted af­
t.er observing a non-rejected sentence. 
By definition, a non-rejected sentence does not con­
tradict any accepted sentence. The above convention 
says that none of the accepted sentences should be 
given up as a. result. of observing a non-rejected sen­
tence . 
Following is the intuition about. changed objections : 
The objection to a sent.ence B. after ob­
serving a non-rejected sentence A, is the 
initial objection to A /1. B minus the initial 
objection to A.. 
The previous convention and intuition imply the fol­
lowing conditionalization rule : 
41A(B):: 
{ true, 
41(.4 /1. B) /1. -.cJ>(A), 
if �(A /1. B) :: true: ( 1) otherwtse. 
Similar to Bayes conditionalization, objection-ba..<:ed 
conditionalization assumes that the observed sen­
tence A is not. reject.ed by �. 
Objection-based conditionalization is an instance of 
abstract conditionalization [4]. which supports pat­
terns of plausible inference that make Bayes condi­
tionalization popular [12]. 
3.2.2 Objection-based pi"oduct rule 
Equation 1 tells us how to change a state of belief 
upon recording an observation. Most often. howewr. 
; Bayes conditionaJization assumes that A is not rt-· 
jected by�-
.4 
( d false A{ . ) 
1!>(-.PI) fa},;e li>A(-.Pt) 
( 2) false AI �) 
11>(-.Pl) false li>A(-.P�) 
• .t 
1 I 
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P?. -.p3 
n •. true 
-.(; ·. -,Q!o false 
()4 :aJ.se 
-.o4 11 -.a� false 
--,pi 1\ p2 -.pi /1 ...,p2 
1V 2 true 
-.o1 "-.o� -.01 "-.05 -.01 /1 -.02 1\ -.05 false 
Table 3: An objt>ction-basPd quantification of the causalnet.work in Figure 1. The above objections and Figure 1 
coust.it.ut.e an ohjection-based causal network. 
we have informa tion about a changed st.at.e of belief 
and we want to know more about. the old st.a.te. In 
probability calculus. this is achieved by using an im­
port.a.nt result. called the product rule . It stat.es that. 
P(A II B)= P(BIA) x P(.4). if P(.4) ¥ 0. 
The restriction on the equation above results from 
the inability to condit.ionalize a probabilistic state of 
belief on a sentence with zero probability. 
A corresponding result in objection calculus is 
�(A 1\ B) = -t»A(B) V -t»(.4), if -t»(A) �true and 
[-t»A(B)::: true or -t»A ( B) A�(A) =false]. (2) 
Not.e how logical disjunction is playing the role that is 
played by numeric multiplication in probability cal­
culus. Note also that we have more restrictions on 
this rule than we had on the probabilistic one. Why? 
Well. the story goes as follows. Suppose that a do­
main expert told us that his state of belief is such 
that : 
1. The objection to A is a. 
2. The objection to B after observing A is b. where 
b is invalid and a A b is consistent. 
The above statements are contradictory if the domain 
expert. is using Equation 1 to update his state of be­
lief. Specifically, according to Equation 1, b must 
equal �(A 1\ B) 1\ ..,a. which can happen only if a A b 
is incousist.ent. 
Contradictory statements of the form given above are 
a result of careless assessment. of one ·s objections. An 
IO'Xample will illustrate this point. We all know that 
having no wings is an objection to an animal being a 
bird: 
-t»(bird) = vingless. 
\Ve also know that. abnormality is an objection t.o the 
flying of a bird: 
-t»bird(fly) = -,normal. 
Although the two statements above seem plausible. 
they are in fact cont.ra.di<'t.ory in the wntext of Equa­
t.ion 1. To Sft' this, not.P t.ha.t. Equation 1 implies 
-t».4(B) I= -.�(A). That. is, the given conditional ob­
jection must Pntail the negation of the condition's 
ohject.ion. But abnormality does not entail having 
wings! The problem is that when assessing objec­
tions. we tend to forget the following important fact: 
An invalid conditional objection should 
entail the negation of the objection to the 
condition. 
This, however. can be easily remedied if whenever a 
domain expert provides an invalid b as the objection 
given A, we take that. to mean b conjoined with the 
negation of A's objection : b II -.-t»(A). 
3.3 IRRELEVANCE 
The third component of a causal net.work is a directed 
graph such as the one depicted in Figure l. The 
syntax of the graph does not depend on whether it is 
part of a PCN or an OCN, but its interpretation (the 
information it represents) does. 
Informally. the directed graph of a causal network 
says the following: "Given a conjunction over the 
parents of a proposition P;, information about tbe 
non-descendants of P; become irrelevant to the sup­
port for P;." For example . considering the net.work of 
Figure 1. once we know that "The grass is wet, .. the 
information "It rained" does not. change the support 
for �My shoes are wet." 
Probabilitv calculus formalizes irrelevance in terms of 
condition�! probability. The statement "A becomes 
irrelevant. to B once C is known'' is formalized as 
�The probability of B given C/1.4 equals the probabil­
it.y of B given only C." Formally. irrelevance informa­
tion represented by a PCN can be summarized by a 
siugle t>quation. If D(i) contains the parents of propo­
sition Pi. and 0( i) contains its non-descendants. then 
a PCN a'>.�rts that 
P([i] I [D(i)}) = P([i] I [D(i)] A [O(i)]). 
This says that [O(i)] becomes irrelevant. to [i] once 
[D(i)] is accepted . 
The objection-based formalization of irrelevance is 
similar to the probabilistic one. Specifically, .4 he­
comes irrelevant to B once C is known if and only 
if (a) B's ohjf>ction given C A A is equivalent to B's 
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objection given C and (b) -.B"s obje<"tion giwn C A .-1 
is equivalent. t.o -.B's objection given C.'' Irrelevance 
information in an OCN is summarized by the follow­
ing equat.ion : 
�[DiilJ((i]);; �[Diil)A(Oiii)([i]). (3) 
This says t.hat. thf' objection t.o [i] given the informa­
t.ion [D( i)] is <'qui valent t.o the obje<"tion to [i) given 
t.he more det.ailed information [D(i)] 1\ [O(i)]. . 
4 FROM CAUSAL NETWORKS 
TO STATES OF BELIEF 
Irrelevance information represented hy the network of 
Figure 1 and the probabilities given in Table 2 con­
stitute a complete definit.ion of a probabilistic state 
of belief. This follows from a known result in the 
literature on causal networks (see [11] for example) . 
Similar!:•. irrelevance information rf:'present.ed hy the 
network of Figure 1 and object.ions given in Ta­
ble 3 constitute a complete definition of an objection­
based stat.e of belief. Proving this result is outside 
the scope of this paper - the int.erested reader is re­
ferred to [3] where the proof is given with respect. to 
abstract. causal networks that generalize PCNs and 
OCNs. However. I will show in the remaining of t his 
section that the above claim is true for the OCN that 
was developed in Figure 1 and Table 3. 
Consider the following equation. which is an instance 
of Equation 2: 
5 
�([1, .... 5]) = v �[1... ,j-lJ(Li)J. (4) 
J=l 
Considering prior and conditional objections that. are 
given in Tables 3. it is clear that we cannot evaluate 
Equation 4 because we do not have the objections 
needed. However. by using irrelevance information 
that. is represented by the network of Figure 1, we 
can reduce Equation 4 to: 
�([1. . . ., 5]) = 
�[3J([5]J v �[sJ([4)) v �[uJ([3)) v 4>([2]) v �([1]). 
All conditional and prior objections required by the 
above equation are given in Table 3. For example , 
II»(P5 A P4 1\ P3 A ....,p2 APt) is "'quivalent to 
�p,(Ps) V cflp3(P.d V � ... PzAP, (?3) V lf»(-.?2) V �(Pt ) , 
which is also equivalent to 04 V 03 V Ot. That. is, 
"Either I did not step on the grass or t.he grass is 
covered or it is dark'' is the objection to ''The sprin­
kler was off. but it rained, the grass is wet, shiny and 
my shoes are wet .'' 
&The second part of the definition is not redundant. 
The reason is close!�· related to the example given in Sec­
tion 2.4. 
Probabilistically. P(Ps A P� A ?3 A -.p� A P1) Pquals 
P(.P.�IPa) x P(P41Pa) x P(Pai-.P� 1\ Pl)x 
P(-.P:?) X PtPd = .1518i5. (5} 
Since any sentence about. the network of Figure 1 
can be written as a disjunction of some instances of 
[1. ... , 5). and since �(.4 V B) : <I>( A) A <II( B). we 
can compute the objection to any sentence about the 
network of Figure l. Figure 1 and Table;) do specify 
an objection-based state of belief. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Objection-based causal networks resemble proba­
bilistic causal networks in their structure and be­
havior . In an objection-based network. a depen­
dency between nodes is quantified by providing log­
ical sentences under which the dependency does not. 
exist. Objection-based causal networks enjoy al­
most all propert.ies that make probabilist.ic causal 
networks popular, with the added advantage that. ob­
jections are. arguably. more intuitive than probabil­
ities. Following are other advantages of objection­
based causal networks over their probabilistic coun­
terparts . 
• Incomparable st1pports. Degrees of support in 
OCNs are only partially ordered while their 
probabilistic counterparts are totally orderf'd. 
In the network of Figure 1. probabilistic quan­
tificat.ion has forced us to say that. the causal de­
pendency from "It rained" to "The grass is wet" 
is weaker than the one from "The grass is Wf't'' 
to "Mv shoes are wet." No such commitment is 
enforc�d by objection-based quantification. 
• Intuitiveness. Probably the major objection to 
PCNs is the interpretation of numbers that ar>" 
used in quantifying causal dependencies. For 
example, what doe!' it mean to say that the 
causal dependency from "The grass is wet'" 10 
·'My shoes are wet." has strength .9? Or wors<>. 
what does the number .1518i5 that appears in 
Equation 5 mean [9]? This number does not re­
late in anv intuitive wav to the numbers used 
in quantifying the netwo.rk . On the other hand . 
the strength of a causal dependency in an OCN 
has a very clear interpretation : it is a condi­
tion under which the causal dependency does 
not exist. 
I end this discussion by observing that. objection cal­
culus and objection-based causal networks are closely 
related to clause management syst ems . which are well 
known in AI [1, 13]. 
Acknowledgement 
I have benefited from various discussions with my ad­
visor Matt Ginsberg. Jinan Hussain and H. Srott 
Roy read versions of this paper and provided valu­
able comments . Three anonymous rt>viewers have 
also provided valuable romment.s and "'ugg�t.ions. 
This work has been supported by the Air Foret> Of­
fice of Scientific Research under grant number !..10-
0��63. by NSF under grant number IRitHl- 12 1 88 .  and 
by DARPA/Rome Labs under grant number F30602-
9 l-C-0036 . 
References 
[ 1 ]  E. Charniak. Bayesian net.works without tears. 
The A l llfaga::in t .  1 2( 4 ) :50-63. Winter 11:19 1 .  
[2] A .  Y .  Darwiche. O n  the relation between objec­
tion rakulus and clause management systems. 
( Working paper ) .  1992.  
[3] A.  Y .  Darwiche and M. L .  Ginsberg. Abstract 
causal net. works. ( Working paper ) .  1 992.  
[4] A.  Y. Da.rwiche and M. L. G insberg . A symbolic 
generalization of probabilit.y theory . In Proceed­
mgs of the Tenth Nati onal Confert ll ce on A rti­
ficial Inttlligenct {A A A I). 1992. 
[5] T .  Dean. Coping with uncertainty in a con­
trol system for nav igation and exploration. In 
Proceedings of .4A .4 1, pages 1 0 1 0- 1 0 1 5 .  AAAI , 
1 990. 
[6] J. Doyle. Methodological simplicity in expert 
system construction : The case of j udgements 
and reasoned assumptions. In G .  Shafer and 
J .  Pearl . editors . Readmgs in Uncertain Reason­
ing. pages 689-693. Morgan K aufmann Publish­
ers. Inc .. San Mateo. California. 1 990 . 
(7] R. Goldman . A probabilistic approach to lan­
guage understanding. Technical Report. CS-90-
34 , Department of Computer Science, Brown 
University, 1 990. 
[8] D. Beckerman . Probabilistir similarity networks. 
Technical Report STAN-CS- 1 3 1 6 .  Departments 
of Computer Science and Medicine, Stanford 
University, 1990. 
[9] H. E. Kyburg, Jr. Subjective probabi l ities: Criti­
cisms. reflections and problems . In Epistemology 
and Inference. University of Minnesota P ress, 
1 983. 
[1  0] T. Levitt . J .  Mullin .  and T. B inford . Model­
based influence diagrams for machine vision. In 
Fifth i-Forksh op 011 Uncertainty in Artificial In· 
tel/igence . pages 233-244 . Association for lincer­
tainty in Artificial Intell igence , 1989. 
[ 1 1] J .  Pearl . Probabil1stic Rea.§oning 17! Intelligent 
Systems: Networks of Plausible lnferwce. Mor­
gan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc . . San M ateo. Cal­
ifornia. 1 988. 
[ 1 2] G. Polya. Patterns of Plausible Inference. 
Princeton li n iversit.y Press. Princeton , N.J . 19:)4.  
Objection-based Causal Exception Networks 73 
[ 1 3] R. Rei t er and J .  de Klt>er.  Fouudat ions of 
assumption- based truth maintenance syst.t>ms: 
Prel iminary report. . In Prouedi11gs of A A A I. 
pages 1 $3- 1 88. AAAI.  198i .  
